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Optimal Response to a Transitory Demographic
Shock in Social Security Financing
Juan C. Conesa and Carlos Garriga
The authors consider a transitory demographic shock that affects negatively the financing of
retirement pensions—that is, workers either would have to pay more or retirees would receive
less. In contrast to the existing literature, the authors endogenously determine optimal policies
rather than explore the implications of exogenous parametric responses. Their approach identifies
optimal strategies of the Social Security Administration to guarantee the financial sustainability
of existing retirement pensions in a Pareto-improving way. Hence, no cohort will pay the cost of
the demographic shock. The authors find that the optimal strategy is based on the following ingre-
dients: elimination of compulsory retirement, a change in the structure of labor income taxation,
and a temporary increase in the level of government debt. (JEL D58, D91, H55)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2009, 91(1), pp. 33-48.
financing of retirement pensions.1 In contrast to
existing literature, we follow an approach that is
similar to that used in Conesa and Garriga (2008)
and endogenously determine optimal policies
rather than exploring implications of exogenous
parametric policies. Our approach determines the
optimal strategy of the Social Security Administra  -
tion to guarantee the financial sustainability of
current retirement pensions in the least distor-
tionary way. Moreover, no cohort will have to pay
the welfare cost of the demographic shock.
Notice that we are concerned only about effi-
ciency considerations in the financing of retire-
ment pensions rather than about the efficiency of
their existence in the first place. Their existence
T
he financial sustainability of the
Social Security system is an important
policy concern due to the aging of the
U.S. population and in particular of
the baby-boom generation. According to esti-
mates of the Social Security Administration, the
dependency ratio (measured as population age
65 or older over population between ages 20
and 64) will increase from its present 21 per-
cent to 27 percent in the year 2020, 37 percent
in 2050, and 42 percent in 2080 under the sce-
nario they call the medium population growth
(Figure 1).
Under this demographic scenario, the Social
Security system, which is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
program, will face clear financial imbalances
unless some reforms are introduced. In this paper,
we explore the optimal response to a transitory
demographic shock that affects negatively the
1 In our artificial economy, we assume the transitory nature of the
demographic shock for computational convenience, while Figure 1
clearly shows the permanent nature of the future demographic
shock faced by the U.S. population structure.
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not model why Social Security was implemented
in the first place or why Social Security benefits
are provided through a potentially inefficient tax
system.
We consider for our experiments an unex-
pected transitory demographic shock, even though
these shocks are certainly predictable by looking
at Figure 1. If the demographic shock is predict  -
able, the fiscal authority should have reacted to
it in advance. However, we believe it is more
interesting to focus on what should be done from
now on rather than on what should have been
done. In this sense, prediction of a demographic
shock without action is equivalent to the shock
being unexpected. However, the transitory nature
of the shock considered is a limitation of the analy-
sis driven by computational tractability.
The quantitative evaluation of Social Security
reforms has been widely analyzed in the litera-
ture.3 Demographic considerations play an impor-
tant role in the Social Security debate, but there
are few quantitative studies of policy responses to
demographic shocks and none to our knowledge
from an optimal fiscal policy perspective. In par-
ticular, De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999)
consider the economic consequences of different
alternative fiscal-adjustment packages to solve
the future Social Security imbalances associated
with the projected demographics in the United
States. They find that all fiscal adjustments impose
welfare losses on transitional generations. In par-
ticular, policies that partially reduce retirement
benefits (by taxing benefits, postponing retirement,
or taxing consumption), or that gradually phase
benefits out without compensation yield welfare
gains for future generations but make most of the
current generations worse off. They conclude that
a sustainable Social Security reform requires
reducing distortions in labor supply or in con-
sumption and saving choices and some transi-
tion policies to compensate current generations
(issuing government debt). Our approach allows
for the endogenous determination of such policies
in a way that nobody faces welfare losses. In other
words, everybody will be guaranteed the same
level of welfare as in the benchmark economy
without a demographic shock. However, for
computational tractability we will substantially
simplify the nature of the demographic shocks
relative to De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent
(1999).
Jeske (2003) also analyzes payroll adjustments
to demographic shocks in an economy similar to
ours. He finds that in contrast with the benchmark
economy not all cohorts are worse off due to the
arrival of the baby boomers. The parents of the
baby boomers gain about 0.5 percent of average
lifetime consumption, the baby boomers lose 1
percent, the children of boomers gain 2 percent,
and the grandchildren lose more than 2 percent.
The intuition for this result comes from move-
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration.
2 One basic reason could be dynamic inefficiencies (see Diamond,
1965, or Gale, 1973). Also, even in a dynamically efficient economy,
Social Security might be sustained because of political economy
considerations (see Grossman and Helpman, 1998; Cooley and
Soares, 1999; or Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000). Also, Social Security
might be part of some general social contract, as in Boldrin and
Montes (2005).
3 Feldstein and Liebman (2001) summarize the discussion on tran-
sition to investment-based systems, analyzing the welfare effects
and the risks associated with such systems.ments in factor prices implied by the demographic
shock and the implied payroll taxes adjustment
to balance the per-period government budget
constraint.
In contrast to both of them, we do not analyze
the different implications of exogenously specified
strategies to guarantee sustainability but instead
optimize over this policy response to demographic
shocks following the Ramsey approach. The quan-
titative analysis of optimal fiscal policy in over-
lapping generations economies was pioneered by
Escolano (1992) and has been recently considered
by Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (1999).
Conesa and Garriga (2008) used a similar frame-
work to analyze the design of Social Security
reforms, and therefore the focus was on efficiency
considerations, abstracting from sustainability
issues.
Our main conclusions indicate that the opti-
mal strategy in absorbing a negative demo-
graphic shock consists of the following:
• Changing the age structure of labor-income
taxation. In particular, labor-income taxes
of the young should be substantially
decreased.
• Eliminating compulsory retirement and
allowing cohorts older than age 65 to 
supply labor in the market.
• Increasing the level of government debt
during the duration of the demographic
shock and then repaying it slowly.
We find that the welfare gains will be concen-
trated for generations born in the distant future
after the demographic shock is over, while it does
maintain the benchmark welfare level for existing
cohorts and current newborns during the shock.
Therefore, no generation is worse off along the
fiscal-adjustment process implied by the demo-
graphic shock. This result contrasts with the find-
ings of De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999),
and Jeske (2003), where either current or future
generations suffer important welfare losses. More
important, we find that a sustainable Social
Security reform does not necessarily require
reducing distortions in consumption and saving
choices. A reduction in labor supply distortions
and the issuing of government debt are sufficient
to compensate current generations.
In addition, we show that the welfare costs
of distortionary taxation are quantitatively impor-
tant right after the demographic shock but are
relatively less important in the long run.
The distortionary impact of the financing of
pensions in our artificial economy is assumed
rather than endogenously determined. In our
benchmark economy, pensions are financed
through linear age-independent payroll taxes, and
individuals do not establish a link between their
individual contributions to the system and their
future pensions. Hence, all the welfare gains
obtained in our analysis are generated by the
minimization of distortions and the redistribution
of these additional resources. Indeed, it could
not be otherwise since the possibility of Pareto
improvements exists only because of the presence
of distortions.
We also show that when the income from
retirement pensions is not taxable, the government
could use this fact to replicate lump-sum taxation
and achieve first-best allocations. Yet since we
want to focus on an environment where the gov-
ernment is restricted to distortionary taxation, we
consider only an environment where the fiscal
treatment of retirement pensions is constrained
to be the same as that of regular labor income.
The rest of the paper describes the benchmark
theoretical framework used, our method of param  -
eterizing our benchmark economy, the optimal
fiscal policy problem using the primal approach,
the experiment we perform, the demographic
shock, and our analysis of the optimal response.
THE THEORETICAL 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE 
BENCHMARK ECONOMY
Households
The economy is populated by a constant meas-
ure of households who live for I periods. These
households are forced to retire in period ir. We
denote by ﾵi,t the measure of households of age
i in period t. Preferences of a household born in
period t depend on the stream of consumption
and leisure this household will enjoy. Thus, the
utility function is given by
Conesa and Garriga
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Every period, each household owns one unit
of time that they can allocate to work or leisure.
One unit of time devoted to work by a household
of age i translates into εi efficiency units of labor
in the market, and these are constant over time.
Technology
The production possibility frontier is given
by an aggregate production function Yt = F￿Kt,Lt￿,
where Kt denotes the capital stock at period t,
and 
is the aggregate labor endowment measured in
efficiency units. We assume the function F dis-
plays constant returns to scale, is monotonically
increasing, is strictly concave, and satisfies the
Inada conditions. The capital stock depreciates
at a constant rate δ.
Government
The government influences this economy
through the Social Security and the general budget.
For simplicity, we assume that initially (before the
demographic shock) these two programs operate
with different budgets. Pensions (pt) are financed
through a payroll tax (τt
p), and the Social Security
budget is balanced. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment collects consumption taxes (τt
c), labor
income taxes (τt
l), and capital-income taxes (τt
k)
and issues public debt (bt) to finance an exoge-
nously given stream of government consumption
(gt).
Thus, the Social Security and government
budget constraints are respectively given by
(2) and 
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(3)         
In response to the demographic shock, how-
ever, both budgets are integrated, and we allow the
government to transfer resources across budgets
to finance the retirement pensions.
Market Arrangements
We assume there is a single representative
firm that operates the aggregate technology, taking
factor prices as given. Households sell an endoge-
nously chosen fraction of their time as labor (li,t)
in exchange for a competitive wage of wt per effi-
ciency unit of labor. They rent their assets (ai,t) to
firms or the government in exchange for a com-
petitive factor price (rt) and decide how much to
consume and save out of their disposable income.
The sequential budget constraint for a working-
age household is given by
(4)  
On retirement, households do not work and
receive a pension in a lump-sum fashion. Their
budget constraint is
(5)             
The alternative interpretation of a mandatory
retirement rule is to consider different labor-
income tax rates for individuals of ages above
and below ir. In particular, a confiscatory tax on
labor income beyond age ir is equivalent to com-
pulsory retirement. Both formulations yield the
same results. However, when we study the optimal
policy, we prefer this alternative interpretation
since it considers compulsory retirement as just
one more distortionary tax that the fiscal author-
ity can optimize over.
In the benchmark economy, a market equilib-
rium is a sequence of prices and allocations such
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subject to their corresponding budget constraints
(equations (4) and (5)), given the equilibrium
prices; firms maximize profits given prices; the
government and the Social Security budgets are
balanced (equations (2) and (3)); and markets clear




We choose one period in the model to be the
equivalent of 5 years. Given our choice of period,
we assume households live for 12 periods, so that
the economically active life of a household starts
at age 20, and we assume that households die with
certainty at age 80. In the benchmark economy,
households retire in period 10 (equivalent to age
65 in years).
Finally, we assume that the mass of house-
holds in each period is the same. All these assump-
tions imply that in the initial steady state the
dependency ratio is 0.33 rather than the 0.21
observed nowadays. The reason is that in our sim-
ple environment there is no lifetime uncertainty.
Endowments
The only endowment that households have
is their efficiency units of labor at each period.
These are taken from Hansen’s (1993) estimates,
conveniently extrapolated to the entire lifetime
of households (Figure 2).4
Government
We assume that in the benchmark economy
the government runs two completely independent
budgets. One is a Social Security budget that oper-
ates on a balanced budget. The payroll tax is taken
from the data and is equal to 10.5 percent, which
is the Old-Age and Retirement Insurance (OASI).
We exclude a fraction going to disability insurance;
the OASDI is 12.4 percent. Our assumptions about
the demographics together with the balanced
budget condition directly determine the amount
of the public retirement pension. It will be 31.5
percent of the average gross labor income.
The level of government consumption is
exogenously given. It is financed through a con-
sumption tax, set equal to 5 percent, a marginal
tax on capital income equal to 33 percent, and a
marginal tax on labor income net of Social Security
contributions equal to 16 percent. We have esti-
mated these effective tax rates following Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994). The effective distortion
of the consumption-leisure margin is given by
￿1 – τ1￿￿1 – τp￿/￿1 + τc￿ = 1 – 0.3, yielding an effec-
tive tax of 30 percent.
The government issues public debt to satisfy
its sequential budget constraint.
Calibration: Functional Forms
Households’ preferences are assumed to take
the form
Conesa and Garriga
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4 To avoid sample selection biases, we assume that the rate of
















Age Profile of Efficiency Units of Labor
SOURCE: Hansen (1993).(6)
where β > 0 represents the discount rate, ʳ ∈ ￿0,1￿
denotes the share of consumption in the utility
function, and σ > 0 governs the concavity of the
utility function. The implied intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption (IES) is equal
to 1/￿1 – ￿1 – σ￿ʳ ￿.
Technology has constant returns to scale and
takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form Yt = Kt
αLt
1–α,
where α represents the capital-income share.
Calibration: Empirical Targets
We define aggregate capital to be the level of
fixed sssets in the Bureau of Economic Analysis
statistics. Therefore, our calibration target will be
a ratio K/Y = 3 in yearly terms. Also, computing
the ratio of outstanding (federal, state, and local)
government debt to gross domestic product (GDP),
we get the following ratio B/Y = 0.5 in yearly
terms. Depreciation is also taken from the data,
which as a fraction of GDP is 12 percent. Another
calibration target is an average of one-third of the
time of households allocated to market activities.
We choose a curvature parameter in the utility
function consistent with a coefficient of relative
risk aversion in consumption of 2 (alternatively
a consumption intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution of 0.5). Government consumption will be
fixed at 18.6 percent of output as in the data.
Finally, the capital-income share is taken to be
equal to 0.3, as measured in Gollin (2002).
Calibration Results
To calibrate our economy, we proceed as fol-


















utility function to be σ = 4 and the capital share
in the production function α = 0.3. Then the dis-
count factor β = 1.003 is chosen to match a
wealth-to-output ratio of 3.5,5 and the consump-
tion share ʳ = 0.327 is chosen to match an average
of one-third of the time devoted to working in the
market economy. The depreciation rate is chosen
so that in equilibrium depreciation is 12 percent
of output. Notice that σ = 4 and ʳ = 0.327 together
imply a consumption intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of 0.5 (constant relative risk aversion
of 2). Table 1 summarizes the parameters chosen
and the empirical targets that are more related to
them.
Using the empirical tax rates and ratio of
government consumption to GDP, we derive from
the government budget constraint an implied
equilibrium government debt of 50 percent of
output. This figure is consistent with the average
figure in the data. Therefore, the capital-to-output
ratio is 3 as desired.
Given this parameterization, Social Security
annual payments in the benchmark economy
amount to 7.35 percent of GDP and the Social




We use the primal approach of optimal taxa-
tion as first proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980). This approach is based on characterizing
the set of allocations that the government can
5 Notice that in a finite-life framework there is no problem with
discount factors larger than 1, and, in fact, empirical estimates
often take values as large.
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Table 1
Calibration Targets and Parameter Values
Contribution of labor Investment
Empirical targets A/Y IES Average hours income/output production
Empirical values 3.5 0.5 1/3 0.7 0.12
Parameters βσʳαδ
Calibrated values 1.003 4 0.327 0.3 0.0437  implement with the given policy instruments
available. A benevolent fiscal authority chooses
the optimal tax burden, taking into account the
decision rules of all individuals in the economy
and the effect of their decisions on market prices.
Therefore, the government problem amounts
to maximizing the social welfare function over the
set of implementable allocations together with
the status quo constraints (that guarentee Pareto
improvements).6 From the optimal allocations, we
can decentralize the economy, finding the prices
and the tax policy associated with the optimal
policy.
A key ingredient is the derivation of the set of
implementable allocations. Effectively, it amounts
to using the consumer’s Euler condition and labor-
supply condition to express equilibrium prices as
functions of individual allocations and then sub-
stituting these prices in the consumer’s intertem-
poral budget constraint. Any allocation satisfying
the implementability condition by construction
satisfies the household’s first-order optimality
conditions, with prices and policies appropriately
defined from the allocation. See Chari and Kehoe
(1999) for a description of this approach.
To illustrate this procedure, we derive the
implementability constraint for a newborn indi-
vidual. Notice that in our case the fiscal authority
has to consider retirement pensions as given and
that this is going to introduce a difference with
Erosa and Gervais (2002), Garriga (1999), or Conesa
and Garriga (2008).
We distinguish two cases: first, retirement
pensions are considered as regular labor income
and are treated as such from a fiscal point of view;
and second, retirement pensions are not subject
to taxation. Both cases have different tax policy
implications.
RETIREMENT PENSIONS AS 
TAXABLE LABOR INCOME
For clarity of exposition, we suppress the time
subscripts. Consider the household maximization
problem for a newborn individual facing equi-
librium prices and individual specific tax rates
on consumption, labor income, and capital
income:
Notice two important features of this formu-
lation. The first one is that individuals of age ir
and older have a retirement pension, denoted by
p, as part of their labor income (and it is taxed at
the same rate as regular labor income). Second,
on retirement individuals could still supply labor
in the market.
Denoting by υi the Lagrange multiplier of the
corresponding budget constraint, the necessary
and sufficient first-order conditions for an interior
optimum are given by
(7)                 
(8)                  and
(9)                 
together with the intertemporal budget constraint.
Multiplying these conditions by the corres  pond  -
  ing variable we get
(10)                
(11)                 and
(12)                
Let pi = p if i = ir,…,I, and zero otherwise.
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6 Throughout the paper, we assume that the government can com-
mit to its policies. This is an important restriction that affects the
results. The analysis of a time-consistent reform goes beyond the
scope of this paper.where the second equality comes from using
equation (12) and the budget constraints.
Finally, using equation (8) we get
or:
(13)        
where w denotes the marginal product of labor.
Any feasible allocation of consumption and
leisure satisfying equation (13) can be decentral-
ized as the optimal behavior of a consumer facing
distortionary taxes. These distortionary taxes can
be constructed by using the consumer’s optimality
conditions for the labor and leisure and for the
consumption and savings margins. In particular,
given an allocation and its corresponding prices,
constructed from the marginal product of labor
and capital, we can back out the optimal tax on
capital and labor income by using the Euler and
labor-supply conditions:
(14)         and
(15)                     
Notice that in this case the optimal policy is
not uniquely determined. Labor and consumption
taxation are equivalent in the sense that they deter-
mine the same distortionary margin. Also, the
taxation of capital income is equivalent to taxing
consumption at different times at different rates.
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In practice, this implies that one of the instruments
is redundant. For example, we could set consump-
tion taxes to zero (or to any other constant) and
decentralize the allocation using only labor- and
capital-income taxes by solving a system of two




Finally, directly using the consumer’s budget
constraints, we could construct the corresponding
sequence of assets. That way we would have con-
structed an allocation that solves the consumer’s
maximization problem.
The primal approach of optimal taxation sim-
ply requires maximizing a social welfare function
over the set of implementable allocations—subject
to the feasibility constraint, an implementability
condition such as equation (13) for the newborn
cohorts, and additional implementability con-
straints for each cohort alive at the beginning of
the reform. We also impose that allocations must
provide at least as much utility as in the initial
steady state of our economy. The allocation
implied by the optimal policy can be decentralized




If pensions are not taxable, the maximization
problem of the households is given by
Consequently, through the same procedure
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(16)      
Notice that in this case the implementability
constraint does include a tax term in it, τi
c. This
did not happen before in expression (13). Hence,
it is always possible to choose a particular taxation
of consumption such that the implementability
constraint is always satisfied. The reason is that
now the fiscal authority could tax consumption
at a high level but still compensate the consumer
through other taxes. In the previous case, this
strategy was not available since it was impossible
to tax away the retirement pensions and compen-
sate the consumers without introducing additional
distortions in the system.
Another way to illustrate this simple intuition
is by simply looking at the intertemporal budget
constraint of the household:




c. We impose the same taxation of
consumption at each point in time of the lifetime
of an individual. Then we could rewrite equation
(17) as
Clearly, one could choose any desired level
of taxation of τ
c and still introduce no distortion
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c would act as a lump
sum tax.
Therefore, under this new scenario the plan-
ner could decentralize a first-best allocation by
strategically setting consumption taxes to repli-
cate lump sum taxation.
Notice that this strategy cannot be replicated
for the case when retirement pensions are taxable
as regular labor income, since the equivalent of
equation (17) would be
(18)     
and hence the fiscal authority is forced to intro-
duce a distortionary wedge in the consumption-
leisure margin when trying to implement lump
sum taxation as before.
We are interested in distortionary tax
responses to demographic shocks. Consequently,
we focus on the scenario where the fiscal treat-
ment of retirement pensions has to be the same
as the one of regular labor income. However, we
compare the outcomes, in terms of welfare, with
the ones that could be obtained if the government
could implement lump sum taxation.
THE RAMSEY PROBLEM
We assume that in period t = 1 the economy
is in a steady state with a PAYG Social Security
system and that no demographic shock or govern-
ment intervention has been anticipated by any of
the agents in the economy. The expected utility
for each cohort remaining in the benchmark
economy is given by 
where c ˆs, l ˆ
s are steady-state allocations of cohort s.
At the beginning of period 2, the demographic
shock is known, and then in response to it the
optimal policy from then on is announced and
implemented. We require that the fiscal authority
guarantees to everybody at least the level of utility
of the benchmark economy so that the resulting




s s = − ( )
−
=







































FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2009 41policy reform constitutes a Pareto improvement.
This participation constraint will ensure that the
optimal response to a demographic shock gener-
ates no welfare losses (neither for the initially
alive nor the unborn).
Notice that we are imposing a very strong
participation constraint, since we require that
nobody is worse off relative to a benchmark in
which actual fiscal policies would have been
sustainable forever (i.e., the initial steady state).
Alternatively, we could have postulated different
arbitrary policy responses to the demographic
shock generating welfare losses for some genera-
tions and then improved on those. Clearly, our
specification imposes stronger welfare require-
ments and is independent of any arbitrary non  -
optimal policy we might have chosen instead.
Besides, the main conclusion in the literature is
that no matter what policy you choose, somebody
will have to pay the cost of the demographic
shock. We show this is not necessarily the case.
The government objective function is a utili-
tarian welfare function of all future newborn
individuals, where the relative weight that the
government places on present and future genera-
tions is captured by the geometric discount factor
ʻ ∈ ￿0,1￿, and U￿ct, lt￿ represents the lifetime
utility of a generation born in period t.
Conditional on our choice of weights placed
on different generations,7 the Ramsey allocation
is the one that solves the following maximization
problem:
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(23)                   
Constraint (19) is the standard period resource
constraint. Constraint (20) is the implementability
constraint for each generation born after the reform
is implemented and is exactly the one derived
in equation (13). This equation reveals that the
government faces a trade-off when determining
the optimal labor-income tax of the older genera-
tions. A higher labor-income tax is an effective
lump sum tax on Social Security transfers, but it
also reduces the incentives of the older generations
to supply labor in the market. The optimal policy
will have to balance these opposite forces. Con  -
straint (21) represents the implementability con-
straints for those generations alive at the beginning
of the reform, where τk is the benchmark tax on
capital income, which is taken as given and a –
i,2
are the initial asset holdings of generation i. Notice
that taking τk as given is not an innocuous assump-
tion, since that way we avoid confiscatory taxation
of the initial wealth. Finally, constraints (22) and
(23) guarantee that the policy chosen makes every-
body at least as well off as in the benchmark econ-
omy. In particular, given that the government
objective function does not include the initial s
generations, equation (22) will be binding.
This formulation imposes some restrictions,
since it rules out steady-state golden-rule equilib-
ria. Also, the initial generations alive at the begin-
ning of the reform are not part of the objective
function and appear only as a policy constraint.
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7 We are identifying one Pareto-improving reform, but it is not
unique. Placing different weights on generations or the initial old
would generate a different distribution of welfare gains across
agents.An equivalent formulation would include the
initial s generations in the objective function with
a specific weight ʻs, where the weight is chosen
to guarantee that the status quo conditions for
each generation are satisfied.
The policymaker discounts the future at the
exponential rate ʻ. The Pareto-improving nature
of the reform implies that the rate ʻ has to be big
enough to satisfy the participation constraints of
all future generations. In particular, if ʻ were too
low, then the long-run capital stock would be too
low, and future generations would be worse off
than in the benchmark economy. That restricts
the range of admissible values for ʻ.
Within a certain range, there is some discretion
in the choice of this parameter, implying a differ-
ent allocation of welfare gains across future gener-
ations. To impose some discipline, we choose ʻ
so that the level of debt in the final steady state is
equal to that of the benchmark economy and all
debt issued along the transition is fully paid back
before reaching the new steady state. Our choice
of the planner’s discount factor, the parameter 
ʻ = 0.957, implies the full repayment of the level
of debt issued in response to the demographic
shock. That does not mean that the ratio of debt
to output will be the same in the final steady state,
since output does change.
FURTHER CONSTRAINTS IN THE
SET OF TAX INSTRUMENTS
We impose additional restrictions in the set of
fiscal instruments available to the fiscal authority.
This can be done by using the consumer’s first-
order conditions in order to rewrite fiscal instru-
ments in terms of allocations and then imposing
additional constraints on the Ramsey allocations.
The regime we investigate is one in which
capital-income taxes are left unchanged relative
to the benchmark. Reformulating this constraint
in terms of allocations, we need to impose
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We introduce this constraint since we want
to analyze an environment in which the reforms
involve only changing the nature of labor-income
taxation so that welfare gains are accrued only
because of the change in the nature of the financ-
ing of retirement pensions rather than a more
comprehensive reform involving also changes in
the nature of capital-income taxation. Moreover,
as Conesa and Garriga (2008) show, the additional
welfare gain of reforming capital-income taxation
is very small.
With such a constraint, the only instruments
available to the fiscal authority will be the taxation
of labor income and government debt.
A TRANSITORY DEMOGRAPHIC
SHOCK
In our experiment, we introduce an unex-
pected transitory demographic shock, capturing
the idea that an increase in the dependency ratio
is going to break down the sustainability of the
Social Security system we had in the initial steady
state of our benchmark economy.
The reason that we want to model it as an
unexpected shock is that we want to investigate
the optimal response from now on, instead of
focusing on what we should have done in advance
of an expected shock.
Since introducing realistic demographic pro-
jections would imply having to change substan-
tially the demographic structure of our framework,
we choose a very simple strategy. We simply
increase the measure of retiring individuals for
three consecutive periods. Notice that the demo-
graphic shock is transitory, in the sense that for
three periods (equivalent to 15 years) we face
raising dependency ratios, and then for another
three periods the dependency ratio falls until
reaching its original level and staying there forever.
We chose this specification of the demographic
shock for computational convenience, since other-
wise the model would imply changes in the age
structure over time. The alternative would have
been an environment where at some point the
final age permanently increases reflecting an
increase in life expectancy. This raises some com-
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could forecast the demographic evolution and
form expectations about future paths of govern-
ment action. Hence, the benchmark economy
would not be a steady state anymore, and the state
of the economy at the benchmark date would be
fully driven by arbitrarily chosen expectations.
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the depen  -
dency ratio over time.
We have arbitrarily chosen to label the initial
steady state in period 1 as the year 2000, and the
demographic shock will be observed and fully
predictable at the beginning of period 2 (the
year 2005). Hence, the results that follow imply
that the policy response from 2005 on is publicly
announced and implemented at the beginning of
2005.
Notice that both individuals and the govern-
ment are assumed to be surprised by the demo-
graphic shock. The government learns that given
the demographic evolution the system is not sus-
tainable and then implements a policy that ration-
alizes the financing of pensions. Not only will the
government optimally respond to the demographic
shock guaranteeing the financial sustainability
of pensions in a Pareto-improving way, but more-
over the government will permanently change the
financing scheme of pensions, hence generating
long-run welfare gains relative to the benchmark
economy. Our exercise is silent about the reasons
why any collective decision process would have
resulted in such a distortionary financing scheme
in the first place. Indeed, the demographic shock
in our exercise triggers the government response,
but there is no clear reason why the government
should not reform the system in the first place even
in the absence of a demographic shock, purely for
efficiency considerations. This is exactly what
Conesa and Garriga (2008) do in an environment
where the government is not constrained to guar-
antee the pensions promised in the past.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The optimal reform is obtained by solving the
maximization problem as stated in the previous
section, with the only difference that we have intro-
duced equation (24) as an additional constraint.
We find that the optimal financing scheme
implies differential labor-income taxation across
age. Why would the government choose to tax
discriminate? The critical insight is that when
individuals exhibit life-cycle behavior, labor pro-
ductivity changes with the household’s age and
the level of wealth also depends on age. As a result
the response of consumption, labor, and savings
decisions to tax incentives varies with age as well.
On the one hand, older cohorts are less likely to
substitute consumption for savings as their
remaining life span shortens. On the other hand,
older households are more likely to respond neg-
atively to an increasing labor-income tax than
younger cohorts born with no assets, since the
elasticity of labor supply is increasing in wealth.
Therefore, the optimal fiscal policy implies that
the government finds it optimal to target these
differential behavioral elasticities through tax
discrimination.
Figure 4 describes the evolution of the average
optimal taxes along the reform. We decentralize
the resulting allocation leaving consumption taxes
unchanged, even though it is possible to decentral-
Conesa and Garriga
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Figure 3
Evolution of the Dependency Ratio for
Simulated Demographic Shockize the same allocation in alternative ways. In
particular, we could set consumption taxes to zero
and increase labor-income taxes so that they are
consistent with the optimal wedge chosen by the
government.
In displaying the results, we arbitrarily label
the year 2000 to be the steady state of the bench-
mark economy, and the reform is announced and
implemented the following period (in 2005).
Remember that a period in the model is 5 years.
Labor-income taxes are substantially lowered
the first period following the reform (the com-
bined impact of labor-income and payroll taxes
was a 24.8 percent effective tax on labor in the
benchmark), but then they are increased to repay
the initial debt issued and reach a new long-run
equilibrium around 22 percent on average.
Figure 5 displays its distribution across age
at different points in time. The optimal labor-
income tax rate varies substantially across cohorts.
In the final steady state, the optimal labor-income
tax schedule is concave and increasing as a func-
tion of age, up to the point at which individuals
start receiving a pension. On retirement, the tax-
ation of labor income (remember that retirement
pensions are taxed at the same rate as regular
labor income) is higher. This feature reflects the
tension between the incentives for the fiscal
authority to tax away the retirement pensions and
the distortions that introduces on labor supply.
Intuitively, the fiscal authority introduces
such labor-income tax progressivity to undo the
intergenerational redistribution in favor of the
older cohorts that the Social Security system is
generating.
As a result of this new structure of labor-
income taxation, individuals will provide very
little labor supply after age 65 and almost none in
the last period, as shown in Figure 6. Notice that
the shape of labor supply is not dramatically
changed with the reform, except for the fact that
individuals would still provide some labor while
receiving a retirement pension. However, the
amount of labor supplied by the oldest cohorts is
quite small.
The initial tax cuts, together with the increas-
ing financial needs to finance the retirement pen-
sions, necessarily imply that government debt has
to increase in the initial periods following the
reform.
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Labor-Income Tax Rates Across Different
Cohorts at Different TimesNext, Figure 7 displays the evolution of gov-
ernment debt over GDP associated with the opti-
mal reform. To finance retirement pensions,
government debt would increase up to 77 percent
of annual GDP (relative to its initial 50 percent).
Later on, this debt will be progressively repaid.
Overall, such a reform generates welfare gains
only for those cohorts born once the demographic
shock is over. However, the optimal response
guarantees that the cohorts initially alive and
those born during the shock enjoy the same level
of utility as in the benchmark economy. Notice that
by construction the initial old were not included
in the objective function, and as a consequence
the constraint to achieve at least the same utility
level as in the benchmark economy has to be nec-
essarily binding. This was not the case for new
generations born during the demographic shock
since they were included in the objective function
of the fiscal authority. Yet the optimal policy
response implies that the constraint will be bind-
ing, and only after the demographic shock is over
will newborn cohorts start enjoying higher welfare.
The welfare gains accruing to newborns are plot-
ted in Figure 8.
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Labor Supply Across Different Cohorts at
Different Times
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Welfare Gains of Newborn GenerationsThe optimal response associated with the sus-
tainable policy contrasts with the findings where
policies are exogenously specified as in De Nardi,
Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999), where the initial
cohorts are worse off, and Jeske (2003), where the
baby boomers and the grandchildren of the baby
boomers suffer welfare losses. In our economy,
the cost of the shock is distributed over the cohorts
initially alive and those generations born during
the shock. Remember that the latter do enter the
government’s objective function, and hence the
planner would be happy to allocate some welfare
gains to these generations if it were possible.8
Notice that the welfare gains associated with
the reform just discussed, labeled as “Ramsey” in
Figure 8, are much smaller than those associated
with the first-best allocation, labeled as “Planner.”
By construction, we have prevented the fiscal
authority from lump sum taxing the retirement
pensions. If we were to allow the fiscal authority
to tax differently retirement pensions from regular
labor income, the fiscal authority would choose
to do so imposing on pensions taxes higher than
100 percent, effectively replicating a system with
lump sum taxes. Notice that the welfare gains from
doing so (labeled as “Planner”) would be much
higher, especially for the initial generations. This
comparison indicates that the welfare costs of
having to use distortionary taxation are very high,
especially at the initial periods of the reform.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided an answer to
a very simple and policy-relevant question: What
should be the optimal response to an unantici-
pated transitory demographic shock in Social
Security financing? To answer this question, we
use optimal fiscal policy to determine the optimal
way to finance some promised level of retirement
pensions through distortionary taxation. In our
experiment, the presence of a demographic shock
renders the actual way of financing the Social
Security system unsustainable, and our approach
endogenously determines how to accommodate
this shock, at the same time that the pension
financing scheme is permanently changed to
reduce distortions.
We find that the government can design a
Pareto-improving reform that exhibits sizeable
welfare gains in the distant future, after the demo-
graphic shock is over. This shows that the pressure
induced by the demographic shock is substantial,
since the reduction of the existing large distor-
tions only prevents welfare losses but does not
generate welfare gains until further away in the
future. Our approach explicitly provides quanti-
tative policy prescriptions toward the policy
design of future and maybe unavoidable Social
Security reforms.
The optimal response consists of the elimina-
tion of compulsory retirement, decreasing labor-
income taxation of the young, and a temporary
increase of government debt to accommodate the
higher financial needs generated by the increase
in the dependency ratio.
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